Approved For ease 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP81B00401 02400220029-4	
	25X <sup>-</sup>
14 January 1980	
MEMORANDUM FOR: NIOs and NFAC Office Directors    Executive For any	
FROM : PB/NSC Coordinator	
SUBJECT : DCI's Congressional Worldwide Wrap-up	25X <sup>2</sup>
1. The Director reviewed some of the material provided him over the weekend and has expanded on his earlier outlines reflecting his current thinking as to the approach he will take. Thus far he has done three outlines (all attached):	
<ul> <li>Strategic and conventional balance and the USSR</li> </ul>	
Middle East and South Asia	
• East and Southeast Asia	25X′
2. Over the weekend we also reviewed all the material and will be in touch with NIOs and analysts today to go over what else is needed.	
3. The next iteration of the material will be provided the Director NLT 1200 Wednesday, 16 January, prior to his departure from the area. He will work on the briefing while he is away as will we.	25X <sup>^</sup>
4. Everyone is reminded to start the preparation of graphics which may be used (whether as part of his presentation or to have as backup) as soon as possible.	
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Attachments As stated	
cc: DDCI DD/NFA DDO LC	25X <sup>2</sup>
ES EA/DCI	_
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## WORLDWIDE BRIEFING OUTLINE

	(30	Minutes	) I.	Strategic	Force	Ba	lance
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- A. Trends of past year
  - Progress toward MIRV limits
  - 2. Progress on accuracy
  - R&D/Test programs
- B. Comparative status and trends

1.			

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- C. Possible Soviet responses to this situation
  - 1. Within SALT II limits
    - a. Curves of warheads vs. US aim points
  - Without SALT II limits
    - a. Likely early actions:
      - (1) Don't dispense w/old systems, e.g. \$SBNs
      - (2) Test more warheads on SS-18
      - (3) Install more warheads on SS-18
      - (4) Deploy SS-16
      - (5) ?
    - b. Possible trends in warheads vs. aim points if:
      - (1) Sov start in '80
      - (2) Sov start in '82
      - (3) Sov start in '86

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### (15 Minutes) II. Warsaw Pact-NATO Balance

- TNF issue
  - Comparative data as seen by both sides
    - SS-4/5 issue
    - b. SS-20 status
      - (1) New basing mode -?
- Trends in other areas
  - 1. Brezhnev reductions
    - Actual
    - Announced
    - c. Comparison with totals
  - 2. 1979 disparities in improvement rates?
  - 3. W.P. and NATO plans -
    - WP ambitious plans for modernization/standardization not likely to be effected
    - NATO 3% who's in and out?
- Soviet non-military posture
  - Economy -

Going downhill

Why?

Impact grain sanctions

Impact other sanctions

E. European petard

Economies

Rigidity except Hungary

Necessity of facing price changes

Impact of sanctions

C. Succession

When -Who -Impact?

D. Yugoślavia

Tito health

Soviet moves?

# WORLDWIDE BRIEFING OUTLINE - MID EAST - SOUTH ASIA

I. World Energy situation (5 min.)

#### A. Trends

 Conservation - both in current production & in investment in expanded capacity

(Chart comparing both as seen in '77 & '80)

- 2. Demand & growth rates down
- Discoveries vs. consumption in decade of '70s
- 4. New production vs. demand


N. Sea Mexico N. Slope

- 5. Soviet confirmation of forecast
- B. Outlook
  - 1. Precarious balance
  - 2. Price pressures likely
  - 3. Oil embargo always possibility

- D. Iran
  - 1. Internal situation
    - a. Rev. Council only gov't won out over secular gov't
    - b. Khomeini veto/guidance
    - Student veto on hostages
      - Revolution protectors attempt to be political power factor
    - d. Ethnic dissensions
    - e. Economic stagnation
- E. Afghanistan
  - Chronology (chart) of Soviet moves
  - 2. Prognoses on life of insurgency

Length Soviet stay -

- 3. Spill over problems
  - a. Baluchistan Iran
  - b. Pakistan



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# WORLDWIDE BRIEFING - PART III - ASIA

#### I. PRC

A. Political

Deng up and down

General equilibrium

B. Economic

Foremost modernization objective

Can meet goals

Amount capital likely borrow

New philosophy and Marxism?

C. The triangle

Normalized w/US & Japan

Not anxious to provoke Soviets more than necessary

Not ready

Military - no match

Defensive retreat only tactic

Underlying hostility undiminished

But tactically not want either be too wedded to and dependent on US or too subject to Soviet pressures

#### II. SEA

A. PRC vs. USSR is main theme

VN proxy

B. Kampuchea immediate issue

Can Pol Pot or substitute hold out?

Will spill into Thailand?

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PRC less inclined to second lesson (Describe VN-PRC force balance)

C. Real issue is ASEAN

Wavering a bit in support Thailand

TTT Korea

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